Strategy updating rules and strategy distributions in dynamical multiagent systems.
In the evolutionary version of the minority game, agents update their strategies (gene value p) in order to improve their performance. Motivated by the recent intriguing results obtained for prize-to-fine ratios, which are smaller than unity, we explore the system's dynamics with a strategy updating rule of the form p-->p+/-delta(p) (0<or=p<or=1). We find that the strategy distribution depends strongly on the values of the prize-to-fine ratio R, the length scale delta(p), and the type of boundary condition used. We show that these parameters determine the amplitude and the frequency of the temporal oscillations observed in the gene space. These regular oscillations are shown to be the main factors which determine the strategy distribution of the population. In addition, we find that the agents characterized by p=1/2 (a coin-tossing strategy) have the best chances of survival at asymptotically long times, regardless of the value of delta(p) and the boundary conditions used.